El empleo de herramientas digitales está transformando los procesos de producción científica y sus impactos. En este trabajo evaluamos en qué medida la digitalización en ciencia ha alcanzado a la actividad científica en América Latina y cuáles han sido sus efectos. Para eso, utilizamos datos bibliométricos de tres países latinoamericanos de tamaño medio, Argentina, Chile y Colombia, que tienen una trayectoria científica importante y el análisis lo hemos centrado en cuatro disciplinas: ciencias biológicas y agrícolas, ciencias de la tierra y (...) planetarias, ciencias ambientales y ciencias decisionales. Encontramos que la digitalización ha ido creciendo durante los últimos 25 años, pero la brecha con los países líderes sólo se ha reducido levemente. Asimismo, la incidencia de la digitalización varía por disciplina. En términos de beneficios asociados a la digitalización, nuestros resultados muestran que los artículos que utilizan prácticas o herramientas de ciencia digital tienen mayor impacto académico, más colaboración y más internacionalización. Es decir, en estas disciplinas y en estos países, la digitalización ha logrado aumentar la visibilidad de la investigación, potencialmente su calidad y, así, los retornos sociales de los recursos invertidos. También se han ampliado las redes, propiciando de esta forma un mejor aprovechamiento de la inteligencia colectiva y la integración de los problemas de investigación locales a una agenda global, aumentando potencialmente los recursos que se destinan a la investigación en estos países. (shrink)

En el presente, se ofrece una breve reconstrucción histórica de la evolución de la Filosofía y la Historia de la Ciencia hasta hoy y, además, una visión panorámica del estado actual de ambas disciplinas.

One of the protagonists of the darwinist controversy in the Canary Islands (Spain), during the Nineteenth Century, was the advocate and teacher Rafael Lorenzo y García. In this paper, I show his original thought, until now unknown, against the classical darwinism and next to the fixism.Moreover I analyse the philosophical and natural constants in his Estudios filosóficos (1876 y 1877).

Diseases of complex origin have a component of quantitative genetics that contributes to their susceptibility and phenotypic variability. However, after several studies, a major part of the genetic component of complex phenotypes has still not been found, a situation known as “missing heritability.” Although there have been many hypotheses put forward to explain the reasons for the missing heritability, its definitive causes remain unknown. Complex diseases are caused by multiple intermediate phenotypes involved in their pathogenesis and, very often, each one (...) of these intermediate phenotypes also has a component of quantitative inheritance. Here we propose that at least part of the missing heritability can be explained by the genetic component of intermediate phenotypes that is not detectable at the level of the main complex trait. At the same time, the identification of the genetic component of intermediate phenotypes provides an opportunity to identify part of the missing heritability of complex diseases. (shrink)

X. Zubiri, uno de los pensadores espanoles mas sobresalientes en el presente siglo, nos ha hecho ver que el mal se entiende como condicion de la realidad en respectividad ante el hombre, o sea, en la interaccion del hombre con las cosas reales o consigo mismo en cuanto realidad. En este sentido, el mal se entiende desde la realidad condicionada. Como se entiende que el mal surja desde la realidad? Cual es la consistencia del mal en cuanto condicion? En que (...) supera Zubiri la vision del mal como privacion del bien? El presente estudio pretende dar respuesta a tales cuestiones, considerando el planteamiento del mal segun Zubiri desde el contexto de su pensamiento filosofico. Julio Martin Castillo nacio en 1960 en las Yayas, La Vega (Rep. Dominicana). Ordenado sacerdote en 1986. Ha terminado su doctorado en Filosofia en la Pontificia Universidad Gregoriana (Roma). (shrink)

Linguistics of Saying is to be analyzed in the speech act conceived as an act of knowing. The speaking, saying and knowing subject, based on contexts and the principles of congruency and trust in the speech of other speakers, will create meanings and interpret the sense of utterances supplying the deficiencies of language by means of the intellective operations mentally executed in the act of speech. In the intellective operations you can see three steps or processes: first the starting point, (...) intuition or aísthesis; second, the process of abstraction; and third, the inverse: the process of determination or fixing the construct created. (shrink)

Linguistics of saying studies language in its birth. Language is the mental activity executed by speaking subjects. Linguistics of saying consists in analyzing speech acts as the result of an act of knowing. Speaking subjects speak because they have something to say. Tthey say because they define themselves before the circumstance they are in. And this is possible because they are able to know. Speaking, then, is speaking, saying and knowing. In this sense there is a progressive determination. Knowing makes (...) possible saying, and saying determines speaking, or, in other words: speaking involves saying and knowing, and saying involves knowing. The problem thus is to determine the meaningful intentional purpose of the individual speaker to say something in every speech act. (shrink)

Language is nothing but human subjects in as much as they speak, say and know. Language is something coming from the inside of the speaking subject manifest in the intentional meaningful purpose of the individual speaker. A language, on the contrary, is something coming from the outside, from the speech community, something offered to the speaking subject from the tradition in the technique of speaking. The speech act is the performance of an intuition by the subject, both individual and social.

The nanotechnologies and nanomaterials sector is a huge and growing industry. The amount of legislation already in place and still to be produced in order to regulate it will be very substantial. What process is used to produce such regulation? The answer is that very diverse regulatory approaches are and will be used. The approach taken by the European Commission diverges from the one taken by the European Parliament. Moreover, at national level, Member States add their own contribution to the (...) process. This article attempts to describe the landscape and various regulatory actions that have been undertaken by all these actors in the European Union. It first describes the role played by the European Commission and Parliament. It then looks at specific regulatory initiatives from a more sectoral perspective: Cosmetics, Food information, Restriction of the Use of Certain Hazardous Substances in Electrical and Electronic Equipment, Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment and Biocides. The third part of the paper describes some major national initiatives, in particular those concerning the establishment of reporting systems for nanomaterials, mixtures, articles and consumer products containing them, as an example of how to improve the current governance in the EU and to prevent the risks to human health and the environment. The fourth part gives the perspective of the European Trade Union Confederation. Finally it presents some conclusions and policy recommendations, taking into consideration the diversity of regulatory approaches. (shrink)

Gardens on Fire. Fahrenheit 451 Revisited Resumen: En este trabajo proponemos una reconsideración de una de las historias distópicas más populares y discutidas desde mediados del siglo XX, Fahrenheit 451, del escritor y ensayista estadounidense Ray Bradbury. Aunque esta historia ha atraído desde su publicación la atención del pensamiento político y social, creemos que ha sido ampliamente simplificada. A diferencia de ciertos críticos, no creemos que la fábula política de Bradbury fomente, como muchas otras distopías, una falta de perspectiva histórica (...) o una insuficiente comprensión del presente. Si la visión política y cultural de Bradbury es criticable no lo es por su evasión de la historia, sino más bien por una visión histórica demasiado optimista. También queremos mostrar que Bradbury no fue un humanista enemigo de la cultura de masas, ni de la tecnología. El examen en profundidad de su novela y de numeroso material complementario permitirá explicar porqué su historia sobre el sombrío futuro de la sociedad industrial también contenía elementos para imaginar un futuro alternativo. Gracias a ese examen, finalmente, concluiremos que en el caso de Bradbury la ciencia-ficción no solo sirve para imaginar un futuro indeseable, sino, sobre todo, para mantener vivas y transformar tradiciones con las que fabricar un futuro deseable.: In this paper we propose a reconsideration of one of the most popular and discussed dystopian stories since the mid-20th century, Fahrenheit 451, by the American writer and essayist Ray Bradbury. Although this novel attracted the attention of political and social thought since its publication, we think that it has been largely simplified. Unlike some critics, we do not consider that Bradbury's political fable, like many other dystopias, fosters a lack of historical perspective or an insufficient understanding of the present. If Bradbury's political and cultural vision is open to criticism, it is not only for his evasion of history, but rather for an overly optimistic historical vision. We also make clear that Bradbury was not a humanist enemy of mass culture and technology. A close reading of his novel and numerous supplementary material make us to elucidate why his story about the bleak future of industrial society also contains elements to envisage an alternative future. Thanks to this examination we will conclude that, in the case of Bradbury, science-fiction does not serve just to foretell an undesirable future, but it significantly helps to keep alive and to transform traditions with which to manufacture a desirable future. Palabras clave: distopía, tecnologías, libros, memoria, Bradbury. Keywords: dystopia, technologies, books, memory, Bradbury. (shrink)

In this paper I take Rorty’s self-description as a “hedgehog” as the starting point for a portrait of his intellectual temperament. I re-examine in the first instance Isaiah Berlin’s contrast between hedgehogs and foxes as inspired by the proverb of Archilocus. I then analyze, in philosophical terms, some differences between foxes and hedgehogs. I distinguish different types of hedgehogs in order to make clear exactly what kind of hedgehog Rorty was. In spite of his multiple interests and conversations, I argue, (...) Rorty portrayed himself as a hedgehog with only one important idea: the need to overcome notions such as Truth and Reason and to promote a less cruel and more anti-authoritarian way of living. I claim that this single idea is better understood when we pay special attention as to why Rorty gave priority to literature over philosophy, why he made distinctions between different types of writers, and why one of his favorite writers, Nabokov, was only apparently a fox. (shrink)

Quality standards fulfilment is an essential task in manufacturing processes that involves high costs. One target is to avoid the presence of burrs in the edge of machine workpieces, which reduce the quality of the products. Furthermore, they are not easily removed since the part can even be damaged. In this paper, we propose an optimized Convolutional Neural Network, to detect the presence of burrs in images of milling parts. Its design is focused on the optimization of classification (accuracy) and (...) performance metrics (training time and number of trainable parameters). The proposed architecture identifies burrs with a 91.16% accuracy in the test set, outperforming existing models as EfficientNetB0. It also reduces the number of trainable parameters from other models as AlexNet by 1.5 million. The prediction process just takes 48.39 milliseconds per image. Finally, in order to check if the model gets a high activation in the region of interest, a visual explanation of the model is also carried out by using Gradient-weighted Class Activation Mapping. (shrink)

_Confines of Democracy_ is a collection of critical assessments and interpretations of Richard J. Bernstein’s extensive and illuminating work on pragmatism, epistemology, hermeneutics, and social and political theory, including Bernstein’s replies to the contributors.

Linguistics of saying studies language in its birth. Language is the mental activity executed by speaking subjects. Linguistics of saying consists in analyzing speech acts as the result of an act of knowing. Speaking subjects, speak because they have something to say; they say something because they define themselves before the circumstance they are in; and this is possible because they are able to know. Speaking, then, is speaking, saying and knowing. In this sense there is a progressive determination. Knowing (...) makes possible saying, and saying determines speaking. The problem thus is to determine the linguistic intention of the individual speaker to say something in every speech act. (shrink)

The human subject in as much as he knows transforms the sensitive and concrete (the thing perceived) into abstract (an image of the thing perceived), the abstract into an idea (imaginative representation of the thing abstracted), and ideas into contents of conscience (meanings). The last step in the creation of meanings, something being executed in the speech act, consists in fixing the construct mentally created thus making it objectified meanings in the conscience of speakers. The interchange amongst the different steps (...) in the creation of meaning manifests lógos, the state lived by speakers in their interior when speaking, created and developed in words and because of words. (shrink)

Speakers live language, that is, they intuit, create, acquire, perform, speak and say, interpret, use, evaluate and, even, speak of language. The real language is the language lived by speakers. On the contrary linguists, who at the same time are speakers and linguists, study language as something manifesting of front of them. In order to study language it is necessary to determine the degree of reality of the thing called language as the reality lived and used by speakers.

Meaning defines language because it is the internal function of language. At the same time, meaning does not exist unless in language and because of language. From the point of view of the speaking subject meaning is contents of conscience. From the point of view of a language, meaning is the objectification of knowledge in linguistic signs. And from the point of view of the individual speaking subject, meaning is the expressive intentional purpose to say something.

When we speak of language we usually use the concept of a particular language. In this sense the concept denoted with the word language may vary from one language to another. Real language (=the language spoken) on the contrary is the reality lived by speakers thus encompassing complex and multifarious activities. Depending on the language spoken, the modes of thinking, modes of being in the conception of things, and systems of beliefs transmitted by means of particular languages, denote the living (...) reality of language with different grammatical categories. The concept “language” is expressed sometimes with a noun, thus denoting something existing in it; sometimes with a verb, thus denoting an action or an activity; and sometimes with an adverb, thus denoting the mode of an activity. The reality or degree of reality implicit in these grammatical categories involves a particular mode of thinking, prompted with a particular mode of being in the conception of things. Because of this it is necessary to distinguish the concept of language as something different from the reality of language. But first of all it is necessary to determine the reality or degree of reality of both the reality lived by speakers and the thing usually conceived of as language or a language. (shrink)

The most comprehensive manifestation of language can be seen in the activity of speaking. In it the activity of speaking cannot be understood unless it is referred to the concepts of language and a language. Anything in language can be found in the activity of speaking. Because of this you can find what language is if you abstract from the innumerable manifestations of the activity of speaking.

Meaning as the original function of language is the arrangement of internal things on the part of the creative and historical individual subject who speaks a particular language. Meaning constitutes the series of contents making up the linguistic world human subjects can manage real things with. Real things are not described with meanings but merely represented and designated. Meanings represent the essence of things thus making them members of a category. In this sense, meaning is the base to create things (...) in as much as they constitute entities. Only through the operation of determination can meanings designate individual real things. Since meaningful categories are intended to particular purposes, meaning is intentional and inclusive. (shrink)

The changes known as the loss of inflexions in English (11th- 15th centuries, included) were prompted with the introduction of a new mode of thinking. The mode of thinking, for the Anglo-Saxons, was a dynamic way of conceiving of things. Things were considered events happening. With the contacts of Anglo-Saxons with, first, the Romano-British; second, the introduction of Christianity; and finally with the Norman invasion, their dynamic way of thinking was confronted with the static conception of things coming from the (...) Mediterranean. The history of English from the 11th to the 15th century meant the introduction, confrontation and adoption of a new mental conception of things, the static way of conceiving of things, both modes of thinking defining the language today. (shrink)

El decir es anterior y va más allá del hablar, se vale del hablar y constituye la determinación del hablar. No hay un hablar sin un decir y sí puede haber un decir sin un hablar. El acto lingüístico es la manifestación del lenguaje, la lengua, el pensamiento y el conocimiento. Es fruto de un hablar, está determinado por un decir, presupone un conocer y revela la actitud del hablante, un sujeto libre e histórico, que es, a la vez, sujeto (...) hablante, dicente y cognoscente, ante la realidad y el mundo. De la misma manera que no se da un hablar sin un decir, tampoco se da un decir sin un conocer. En su génesis más profunda el conocer determina al decir y éste al hablar. Así, pues, el «ser hablante» (Coseriu) es, a la vez, el sujeto «dicente» (Ortega y Gasset) y el sujeto cognoscente (Coseriu, Ortega y Gasset, Heidegger, Aristóteles), porque se realiza a sí mismo en el acto del hablar y éste está determinado por el acto del decir y en última instancia por el acto del conocer. El decir define al hablante ante la realidad y el mundo y da soporte a lo que es la realidad y el mundo, que no es más que aquello a lo que el sujeto hablante, dicente y cognoscente le atribuye el ser o realidad. El ser humano, «coexistencia actuante de mí o yo con la circunstancia o mundo» (Ortega y Gasset), se libera de la necesidad vital en la que está inmerso, de la circunstancia a la que está inexorablemente ligado, mediante el conocer. Por el conocer el ser humano atribuye a eso que le rodea y afecta «el ser», haciendo de ello «cosas» y «mundo» constituido por «cosas». Todo esto se manifiesta en el acto lingüístico, que es un acto creador en un triple sentido: crea las cosas y el mundo (contenidos de conciencia, significados), crea la realidad de las cosas y el mundo, y crea la expresión de lo que es las cosas y el mundo (el lenguaje y la lengua) mediante lo dicho (lektón) determinado esto por el pensamiento (lógos). El acto lingüístico es creación (poiesis) y es manifestación (apóphansis), acto de crear un mundo y acto de desvelar el mundo interior del sujeto hablante, dicente y cognoscente, acto de desvelar lo que está oculto y que ahora es no-oculto o verdadero (a-lethés). El hablar, el decir y el conocer son acciones vitales del ser humano. El hablar es una acción vital del sujeto creador que le viene de fuera, de la comunidad; el decir es la acción vital que le viene de dentro y que proyecta él mismo hacia fuera, hacia la comunidad; y el conocer es el acto mismo de creación de un sujeto, que es, opuestamente, libre e histórico, absoluto y limitado, creador de formas y participante de formas comunes creadas en la comunidad. El hablar en sí mismo, al igual que la lengua, es a-circunstancial y tiene que ver con la creación en términos absolutos e históricos. El decir como manifestación del interior del sujeto hablante, dicente y cognoscente tiene que ver con la verdad o aquello que se manifiesta desvelándose (a-létheia). De esta manera, podemos ver dos clases de pensamiento o logos: el logos a-circunstancial o intersubjetivo o histórico, lógos semantikós, y el logos que manifiesta una realidad interior y crea una realidad exterior desde el interior del sujeto creador o lógos apophantikós. La lingüística del decir que ahora se presenta recoge una propuesta en el mismo sentido hecha por Ortega y Gasset y es la continuación de la lingüística del hablar de Coseriu. Hace un replanteamiento de la realidad radical, el ser hablante de Coseriu, que es concebido ahora como el sujeto hablante, dicente y cognoscente. Estudia el acto lingüístico, acto del hablar, decir y conocer, como la manifestación primera de la intención significativa de cada sujeto. Se basa en los principios de la lingüística del hablar de Coseriu, especialmente en los que describen el plano universal e individual del hablar, es decir, los principios de la confianza en el hablar del otro y de la congruencia y coherencia en el hablar. Mira, por consiguiente, al acto lingüístico como «producción», como aquello que se crea en el acto único del hablar, decir y conocer. La finalidad de la lingüística del decir es llegar la génesis misma del lenguaje, que no es más que la génesis del acto lingüístico. Analiza el acto lingüístico como la manifestación del acto del conocer, el cual partiendo de la aísthesis o intuición sensible (Ortega y Gasset, Heidegger, Aristóteles) o intuición inédita del hablante (Coseriu), se descompone en una serie de operaciones intelectivas, cada una de las cuales contribuye a configurar de una manera dada la «aprehensión del ser» inicial e inédita. Estas operaciones intelectivas son: la selección, el establecimiento de una designación, la creación de una clase o esencia, la relación, la nominación y la determinación. Tras la presentación y justificación de lo que es cada uno de los conceptos indicados arriba (los cuatro primeros capítulos), el libro dedica un capítulo a cada una de estas operaciones intelectivas, analizada e ilustrada con ejemplos. Como ilustración de lo que puede ser el análisis aquí propugnado, se dedica un capítulo al análisis del adjetivo 'brisk’, adjetivo de conducta de la lengua inglesa. (shrink)

A theory of knowledge is the explanation of things in terms of the possibilities and capabilities of the human way of knowing. The human knowledge is the representation of the things apprehended sensitively either through the senses or intuition. A theory of knowledge concludes about the reality of the things studied. As such it is a priori speculation, based on synthetic a priori statements. Its conclusions constitute interpretation, that is, hermeneutics. Linguistics as the science studying real language, that is, the (...) language spoken, reverts to human subjects in as much as they speak, say and know. Language thus must be studied as a theory of knowledge. (shrink)

Language is nothing but human subjects in as much as they speak, say and know. Language is something coming from the inside of the speaking subject manifest in the meaningful intentional purpose of the individual speaker. A language, on the contrary, is something coming from the outside, from the speech community, something offered to the speaking subject from the tradition in the technique of speaking. The speech act is nothing but the development of an intuition by the subject thus transforming (...) it in words of a language. It is both individual and social. Since human subjects are free and historical, the study of speech acts is hermeneutics, that is, interpreting speech acts with knowing and the human reality. (shrink)

Mi propósito en este trabajo es reconsiderar una de las lecturas más relevantes y provocativas que se han hecho sobre John Dewey en el mundo de habla hispana. En la primera parte reconstruyo las circunstancias que rodearon la difusión, interpretación y traducción de las obras de Dewey en el México de mediados de los años 1940, y en concreto las razones que llevaron a que la visión sociológica que José Medina Echavarría quiso dar de Dewey fuera finalmente desplazada por la (...) filosófica de José Gaos. En la segunda parte analizo la traducción y lectura que Gaos hizo de Experience and Nature de Dewey, teniendo muy presente sus comparaciones con Sein und Zeit de Heidegger . Finalmente, propongo algunas críticas a la visión que Gaos transmite de Dewey como un pensador carente de un tipo de "soberbia diabólica" propia de la verdadera gran filosofía. The purpose of this work is a reconsideration of one of the most relevant and provocative readings of John Dewey written in the Hispanic World. In the first part I reconstruct the circumstances which surrounded the publicity, interpretation and translation of John Dewey's works in the Mexico of the middle 1940's, particularly the reasons why the sociological reading of Dewey that José Medina Echavarría proposed was finally displaced by the metaphysic perspective of José Gaos. In the second part I reconsider Gaos' own translation and interpretation of Experience and Nature, taking in consideration his comparisons with Heidegger's Sein und Zeit . Finally I analyze critically Gaos' view of Dewey as a thinker whose philosophy lacked the "diabolical arrogance" that true great philosophy would seem to require. (shrink)

Language exists because human subjects define themselves in the circumstance they are in. This is possible because they are able to know, not directly through their senses only, but adding something new to the construct they create in their conscience. The main thing they add to the construct created is categories, something invented or fabricated by the human subject at the moment of speaking.